Smart contract bugs / In what order does it run?
Denial of service and locked funds
One user, one failed transfer or one long loop can block a function for everyone. Funds stay locked in the contract.
1 real exploit · $34.0M lost
How the attack works
- A function loops over all users or all positions. When the list grows, the loop needs more gas than a block allows.
- A function sends ETH to many receivers in a loop. One receiver is a contract that always reverts, so the whole call reverts.
- Variants: an attacker sends ETH with
selfdestructto break abalance == xcheck; a griefing call fills a queue.
Vulnerable and fixed code
function distribute() external {
for (uint256 i; i < users.length; i++) { // unbounded loop
payable(users[i]).transfer(share); // one revert blocks all
}
}mapping(address => uint256) public owed;
function claim() external { // pull, not push
uint256 amt = owed[msg.sender];
owed[msg.sender] = 0;
(bool ok,) = msg.sender.call{value: amt}("");
require(ok, "send failed");
}Review checklist
- Use pull payments: each user claims their own funds.
- Do not loop over arrays that users can make longer. If you must loop, process in batches.
- Do not use exact balance checks (
address(this).balance == x). - Make sure an admin pause cannot lock user funds forever: give users a way to exit.
How to test for it
- Test the loop with a large number of entries and check the gas.
- Add a receiver that always reverts, and check that other users can still claim.
Real exploits (1)
-
Akutar NFT: Akutar NFT had about $34M locked forever because a contract bidder could make processRefunds() revert and a wrong require in claimProjectFunds() blocked the project's withdrawal.
Root cause and fix
Vulnerable code:
AkutarNFT · processRefunds()processRefunds() sends ETH to each bidder in a loop and does not check whether the bidder is a contract or handle a failed send. A malicious contract bidder reverts in its fallback, so the whole refund loop fails and later honest bidders never get their refunds. A second bug is an incorrect require check in claimProjectFunds(). It makes that call revert, so the project funds (more than $34M) stay locked.
What would have stopped it: Use a pull-payment refund pattern, where each user withdraws their own refund, or skip failed sends instead of reverting the whole loop. Test the end-of-auction flow, including claimProjectFunds(), against contract bidders that revert and against edge-case counters.