---
title: "Hijacked project websites"
url: https://dontgetrekt.today/scam/hijacked-website
section: "Asked to click, sign or send crypto"
last_seen: 2026-11-04
---

# Hijacked project websites

The real website of a project is taken over. You go to the right address, and it asks you to sign a drainer request.

Targets: DeFi users of the affected project

## Red flags

- The site asks for a new approval or signature that you did not need before.
- The project's X account or Discord warns about a frontend problem.
- The wallet warns that the site is a known phishing site.
- Attackers can also take a domain by tricking the registrar's support. A trusted URL can point to a new site.

## How it works

1. Attackers take control of a project's domain (DNS or registrar account) or its hosted frontend.
2. The real address now serves a copy of the site with a drainer.
3. Users who connect and sign lose their tokens, although they typed the correct address.

## Protect yourself

- Read every signature, even on sites you trust.
- Use a wallet or extension that simulates transactions and shows what you will lose.
- Follow the project's official accounts for incident alerts.

## If it happened to you

1. Revoke the approvals you signed on that site.
2. Move remaining funds to a new wallet if you signed a Permit or a delegation.

## Real examples (10)

- 2026-10-31: On 10/31/2026, about 12 to 15 DeFi front-ends (Flap, Kintsu, Pickle Finance, etc.) registered with Name.com had their domain/DNS hijacked and redirected to a wallet drainer (Step Drainer), with losses of ~US$138 thousand, according to Blockaid. Sources: [@0xzxcom](https://x.com/0xzxcom/status/2116354696613138584), [@MoontokOfficial](https://x.com/MoontokOfficial/status/2116355655766622300), [@TheLashWire](https://x.com/TheLashWire/status/2116357086804099579), [@ShabbirWeb3](https://x.com/ShabbirWeb3/status/2116357872250683792), [@dev_kratos](https://x.com/dev_kratos/status/2116361288502640937)
- 2026-10-29: Polymarket's web frontend was compromised, reportedly via a third-party script. It showed fake signature prompts and malicious transactions that drained users' wallets, and Polymarket put trading into cancel-only mode. Sources: [@vovweb3](https://x.com/vovweb3/status/2115864442340868448), [@yichuan_drive](https://x.com/yichuan_drive/status/2115866931811020852), [@0xak_](https://x.com/0xak_/status/2115868308008227257), [@philarekt](https://x.com/philarekt/status/2115869219157884959), [@brand_mispriced](https://x.com/brand_mispriced/status/2115870072044454312)
- 2026-10-29: A compromised third-party monitoring script (DebugBear) on the CDN injected a wallet drainer into Polymarket, which requested signatures from traders and took about US$2.7M from 726 wallets. Sources: [@crypto_banter](https://x.com/crypto_banter/status/2115870801375502844), [@DeFiTracer](https://x.com/DeFiTracer/status/2115872968949772446), [@timothybumper](https://x.com/timothybumper/status/2115891618049831295), [@kodr_pro](https://x.com/kodr_pro/status/2116899117649785335), [@rst_cloud](https://x.com/rst_cloud/status/2116928473100865743)
- 2026-04-14: CoW Swap's domain suffered a DNS hijacking; MetaMask blocked the dapp and users were warned to avoid the site. Sources: [@MetaMask](https://x.com/MetaMask/status/2044095924033728826), [@CoWSwap](https://x.com/CoWSwap/status/2053880802677555546)
- 2026-10-24: BlockBeats fixed an abnormal malicious script on its web pages and warned users about fake third-party wallet apps. Sources: [@evilcos](https://x.com/evilcos/status/2113826316948824461)
- 2026-08-20: A user lost 1,010 ETH using an old bookmark to the lapsed tornado.cash domain, now serving a malicious frontend that captured withdrawal credentials. Sources: [@efani](https://x.com/efani/status/2090458498643480844)
- 2021-12-02: Badger DAO's front-end was compromised and injected unlimited token approvals to the attacker for users making deposits, draining about $120M. Sources: [rekt.news](https://rekt.news/badger-rekt)
- 2026-11-02: Bitquery traced funds and named wallets tied to a Name.com DNS hijack incident. Sources: [@NoorScreens](https://x.com/NoorScreens/status/2117147855400091990), [@MonstaDomains](https://x.com/MonstaDomains/status/2117270658488918202), [@QIE_WalletWeb3](https://x.com/QIE_WalletWeb3/status/2117961497704075687)
- 2026-11-04: SEAL summary of infrastructure exploits totaling $2.19M, including a leaked cloud key emptying a Solana wallet, a trading-bot key server, and PredictFun's third-party docs site takeover injecting a script that drained ~$400k. Sources: [@_SEAL_Org](https://x.com/_SEAL_Org/status/2117779073107742870)
- 2026-10-27: SlowMist analysed malicious JavaScript injected via the Udesk customer service system that steals cookies and form data and swaps deposit addresses and clipboard contents. Sources: [@SlowMist_Team](https://x.com/SlowMist_Team/status/2115033345675678012)
